Jonathan Robert Weber, By And Through His Guardians And Conservators, Donald R. Weber And Winona Weber, And Donald R. Weber And Winona Weber, Individually v. Springville City, Springville Irrigation Company, Thomas W. Biesinger, And John Does I Through V : Brief Submitted On Behalf of the Appellants by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1983 
Jonathan Robert Weber, By And Through His Guardians And 
Conservators, Donald R. Weber And Winona Weber, And Donald R. 
Weber And Winona Weber, Individually v. Springville City, 
Springville Irrigation Company, Thomas W. Biesinger, And John 
Does I Through V : Brief Submitted On Behalf of the Appellants 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Jackson Howard and D. David Lambert; Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellants 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Weber v. Springville City, No. 19467 (1983). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4752 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JONATHAN ROBERT WEBER, by and 
through his guardians and 
conservators, DONALD R. WEBER 
and WINONA WEBER, and DONALD 
R. WEBER and WINONA WEBER, 
individually, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
SPRINGVILLE CITY, SPRINGVILLE 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, THOMAS W. 
BIESINGER, and JOHN DOES I 
through V, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 59,146 
BRIEF SUBMITTED ON BEHALF 
OF THE APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM ORDERS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FROM THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE 
HAROLD D. MITCHELL, for: 
STRONG & MITCHELL 
197 South Main 
P.O. Box 124 
Springville, Utah 84663-0124 
Telephone: (801) 489-5632 
Attorney for Defendant 
Springville Irrigation Co. 
DON R. STRONG, for: 
STRONG & MITCHELL 
197 South Main 
Springville, Utah 84663-0124 
Telephone: ( 801) 489-5632 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
Springville City 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: ( 801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants 
TIM DALTON DUNN, for 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
650 Clark-Leaming Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
Attorney for Defendant 
Springville City 
DARWIN C. HANSEN":- " 
110 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 295-2391 
Attorney for DefendiirttJ.· c 
Thomas Biesinger //f(/ ... ----
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JONATHAN ROBERT WEBER, by and 
through his guardians and 
conservators, DONALD R. WEBER 
and WINONA WEBER, and DONALD 
R. WEBER and WINONA WEBER, 
i nd iv id u a 11 y , 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
SPRINGVILLE CITY, SPRINGVILLE 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, THOMAS W. 
BIESINGER, and JOHN DOES I 
through V, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 59,146 
BRIEF SUBMITTED ON BEHALF 
OF THE APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM ORDERS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FROM THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE 
HAROLD D. MITCHELL, for: 
STRONG & MITCHELL 
197 South Main 
P .o. Box 124 
Springville, Utah 84663-0124 
Telephone: (801) 489-5632 
Attorney for Defendant 
Springville Irrigation Co. 
DON R. STRONG, for: 
STRONG & MITCHELL 
197 South Main 
Springville, Utah 84663-0124 
Telephone: ( 801) 489-5632 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
Springville City 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants 
TIM DALTON DUNN, for 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
650 Clark-Leaming Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: ( 801) 363-7611 
Attorney for Defendant 
Springville City 
DARWIN C. HANSEN: 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 295-2391 
Attorney for Defendant 
Thomas Biesinger 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
STATEMET OF THE FACTS 
ARGUMENTS . 
POINT I: 
POINT II: 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A HARSH 
REMEDY, AND DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT 
GRANTED WHEN SIGNIFICANT ISSUES 
OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST ... 
THERE ARE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND DEFENDANT 
BIESINGER IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
i 
iv 
l 
l 
2 
2 
7 
7 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 9 
A. There Are Material Issues 
Of Fact Relating To Defendant 
Biesinger's Contractual Assumption 
Of A Duty To Jonathan Weber Based 
Upon The Representations Of His 
Agents, Plaintiffs' Reliance Upon 
Those Representations In Entering 
Into The Contract And The Meaning 
Of The Relevant Contract Provisions 10 
B. There Is A Material Issue Of 
Fact As To Whether The Defendant 
Biesinger's Conduct Constituted 
As Assumption Of A Duty To 
Jonathan Weber. . . . . . . . 12 
i 
POINT III: 
POINT IV: 
POINT V: 
C. There Is A Material Issue 
Of Fact As To Where Jonathan 
Weber Fell Into Hobble Creek. 15 
D. Public Policy Should Require 
That When A Businessman Enters 
Into An Activity For Profit, And 
There Is A Known Danger Close By, 
And There Is No One Else Who Will 
Make The Venture Safe, And There Is 
An Economical And Feasible Way To 
Make It Safe, He Has A Duty To Make 
It Safe. . . . . . . 16 
THERE ARE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF MATER-
IAL FACT RELATING TO THE ACTS AND 
OMISSIONS OF SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY AND DEFENDANT SPRINGVILLE 
IRRIGATION COMPANY IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 17 
A. There Is A Genuine Issue As To 
Whether The Defendant Maintained 
A Condition Which Posed An Unreason-
able Risk To Children, And Was Negligent 
In The Protection Of The Diversion 
Access. • . . . . . . . . 17 
B. Even Where The Courts Have Been 
Reluctant To Apply The Attractive 
Nuisance Doctrine, Relief Has Been 
Granted On Theories Of Common Law 
Negligence. . . . . . . . . 19 
C. There Is A Genuine Issue Of Fact 
As To Where The Plaintiff, Jonathan 
Weber, Fell Into Hobble Creek. 20 
SPRINGVILLE CITY OWED A DUTY OF 
CARE TO THE PLAINTIFFS ARISING 
OUT OF l) CITY ORDINANCES AND 2) 
THE VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF THE 
DUTY ........... . 
SPRINGVILLE CITY AND SPRINGVILLE 
IRRIGATION COMPANY ARE JOINT 
TORTFEASORS IN MAINTAINING AN 
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE WITHIN THE 
CITY LIMITS ....... . 
ii 
21 
24 
POINT VI: 
POINT VII: 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX 
THE INABILITY OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS TO PINPOINT THE EXACT 
LOCATION WHERE JONATHAN WEBER 
ENTERED HOBBLE CREEK DOES NOT 
FORECLOSE ACTION AGAINST 
SPRINGVILLE CITY OR SPRING-
VILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY .. 
DUE TO THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT 
LIABILITY ALL DEFENDANTS ARE 
STILL LIABLE FOR THEIR 
NEGLIGENCE DESPITE PLAINTIFF's 
INABILITY TO PROVE THE EXACT 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY. 
iii 
27 
28 
30 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Barnson et al., v. United States, 531 F. Supp 614 (D.C. 
Utah 1982) ......... . 
Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City, 371 P.2d 211 (Utah 1962) 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 93 P. 570 (Utah 1908) 
Chavoz v. Salt Lake City, 131 P.901 (Utah 1913) 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420 
413 P.2d 807 (1966) ........ . 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (1979). 
Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 (1967) 
Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 578 P.2d 177 (Ariz 1978) 
Herdt v. Koenig, 119 S.W. 56 (Mo. 1909). 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) 
Hughes v. Housely, 599 P.2d 1250 (1979) . 
Livingston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 
565 P.2d 1117, 1118 (Utah 1977) 
Marble v. Parham, 416 P.2d 1006 (Ariz. App. 1966) 
Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666 (Miss. 1926) . 
Partin v. Olney, 591 P.2d 74 (Ariz. App. 1978). 
Peterson v. Fowler, 29 Utah 2d 386, 510 P.2d 523 (1978) 
Robinson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 22 Utah 
2d 163, 540 P.2d 91 (1969) ........ . 
Sallady v. Old Dominion Copper Mining Co., 100 P. 441 
(Ariz. 1909) ...... . 
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 Ca. Rptr. 132, 607 
p. 2d 924 (1980). . . . . . . .... 
iv 
13, 22 
23, 24 
25 
19 
25 
8 
9 
8 
26 
13, 14 
8 
8 
8 
26 
29 
19 
9 
9 
25, 26 
30 
summers v. Tice, 33 Ca. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) 
Transamerica Title Ins., Co., vs. United Resources Inc., 
24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970) 
United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F 3s 188 
(9th Cir. 1980) ....... . 
University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 
504 P.2d 29 (1972) .... 
W.M. Barnes Co., v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co., 627 P.2d 56 
(Utah 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Springville City Ordinances: 
§ 12-2-4 
§ 10-1-4 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 56(C) 
OTHER 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 323 and 342A 
v 
28, 29, 30 
9 
23 I 24 
9 
8 
7, 21, 25 
7 
7 
23 I 24 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JONATHAN ROBERT WEBER, by and 
through his guardians and 
conservators, DONALD R. WEBER 
and WINONA WEBER, and DONALD 
R. WEBER and WINONA WEBER, 
individually, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
SPRINGVILLE CITY, SPRINGVILLE 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, THOMAS W. 
BIESINGER, and JOHN DOES I 
through V, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 59,146 
BRIEF SUBMITTED ON BEHALF 
OF THE APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action against a landlord for negligence and 
breach of contract for failure to adequately maintain a fence, 
gate and common area whichwere represented to adequately pro-
tect small children living in his apartment complex from 
Hobble Creek and structures related thereto. It is also a 
negligence action against the irrigation district, and city, 
relating to creation and maintenance of an attractive nuisance 
and failure to protect the 2 and 1/2 year old plaintiff from 
the dangers therein. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
Prior to trial, the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County granted defendants' motions for summary judgment" 
---
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiffs move the court to reverse the orders of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County which granted 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case before the court relates to certain real property 
and structures erected thereon which are located in Springville 
City, Utah County, State of Utah. A survey of the property is 
part of the record on appeal (R. 478). A copy of a portion of 
the survey is included herewith as the next page (p. 3) of 
this brief. 
The building designated as the apartment complex is the 
building owned by defendant Biesinger at the time of plaintiff 
Jonathan Weber's injuries. Donald and Winona Weber were 
unloading their belongings and transferring them to apartment 
number 36 which they had rented from defendant Biesinger. (R. 
529). Donald Weber had parked the vehicle containing his 
family's belongings in the parking lot near the southeast 
corner of the apartment complex (R. 569, depo. of Donald Weber 
p. 16). 
The dam, the bridges located above the dam and other 
related structures were erected and maintained by defendants 
Springville Irrigation Company and Springville City as more 
specifically set forth at a later point in this Statement of 
r acts ( p. 6 ) . 
In 1975, defendant Biesinger constructed the fence depic-
ted in the survey to protect the small children living in the 
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I 
SWENSON LANE 
Note: 
1) Bridge is located on Seventh East just 
North of its junction with Swensen Avenue. 
2) The dam of the Springville Irrigation Company 
is located directly east and adjacent to the 
bridge on Seventh East. The head gates and 
control wheels of the dam are accessed by a 
foot path and walkway over the diversion 
structure which attaches to the bridge. 
apartment complex from the danger of the constantly running 
irrigation ditch on the adjacent property. (R. 574, depo. of 
Biesinger p. 8). The fence which defendant Biesinger con-
structed connected with the neighboring chain link fence on 
the west end. (R. 571, depo. of Gene Wing p. 21). On the 
east end, however, the fence ended near the bridge, leaving a 
space through which people could pass; there was no side 
fence. (R. 571 depo. of Gene Wing p. 57). Hobble Creek, just 
40 feet farther from his property in some places than the 
irrigation ditch, is full of water and dangerous during part 
of the year. (R. 574, depo. of Biesinger p. 8). After the 
irrigation ditch was covered defendant Biesinger felt the 
value of the fence had diminished, and therefore, the gate on 
the west end was not maintained, and the fence had been 
allowed to develop holes through which children passed. (R. 
574, depo. of Biesinger, p. 9, 24, 31) 
Shortly before the 13th of June, 1980, plaintiffs ans-
wered defendant Biesinger's advertisement for an apartment for 
rent. They were shown the apartment by agents of defendant 
Biesinger purporting to be the managers. Plaintiffs became 
concerned when they heard the sound of running water in nearby 
Hobble Creek. (R. 569, depo. of Don Weber p. 10, 11, 12). In 
the interest of the safety of their 2 1/2 year old son, 
Jonathan Weber, the plaintiffs specifically asked whether the 
common area was safe for children to play in and whether small 
children could gain access to the stream. (R. 569, depo. of 
Don Weber p. 10, 11, 12) Plaintiffs were reassured by defen-
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dant Biesinger's agents that the common area was safe, that a 
proper and sufficient gate and fence had been placed to the 
rear of the property, and that children could not get to the 
stream. (R. 569, depo. of Don Weher p. 10, 11. 12) 
Plaintiffs relied upon the representations of defendant 
Biesinger's agents and entered into a rental agreement with 
defendant Biesinger for the lease of the premises (R. 529). 
This lease agreement was signed by different agents of defen-
dant Biesinger than those who first showed plaintiffs the 
apartment. (R. 569, depo. of Don Weber p. 10, 11, 12) Defen-
dant Biesinger agreed, as a clause in the contract, to main-
tain both the interior and the exterior of the property in a 
safe and operable condition (R. 529). 
The fence described by defendant Biesinger's agents was, 
in fact, in substantial disrepair, and was wholly inadequate 
to prevent access by small children to Hobble Creek (R. 355, 
356, 425, 426). Additionally, the alleged gate in the descri-
bed fence did not exist and left an opening in the fence for 
access to Hobble Creek (R. 355, 356, 425, 426). 
On or about June 18, 1980, the plaintiffs were in the 
process of moving into the Biesinger apartment building when 
Jonathan Weber, age 2 1/2 years, gained access to Hobble Creek 
from the CO!'l1Tlon area of the Biesinger apartment building (R. 
7). Jonathan Weber fell into Hobble Creek and was rescued 
from the creek a short time after the discovery of his absence, 
but not before he sustained permanent debilitating physicial 
and mental injuries (R. 7). Jonathan Weber is presently a 
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spastic quadriplegic with severe brain damage which prevents 
his normal development and which requires extensive attention 
and significant expense for his maintenance (R. 7). 
ThP following supplemental facts are necessary for the 
cause of action against Springville Irrigation Company: 
Springville Irrigation Company has the right to divert water 
out of Hobble Creek for irrigation purposes. (R. 569, depo. 
of Hardy LeRoy Child p. 5). Springville Irrigation Company 
constructed Swenson Dam. The dam is located directly east and 
adjacent to the bridge and is part of the bridge structure. 
(R. 134, 172). Hobble Creek is used as an overflow channel to 
release unused and unwanted irrigation water. (R. 567, depo. 
of Hardy LeRoy Child p. 9). When all of the water is used for 
irrigation purposes, Hobble Creek dries up. (R. 567, depo. of 
Hardy LeRoy Child p. 9). The watermaster, Hardy LeRoy Child, 
was aware that the children play at Swenson Dam in the summer 
and was fearful about it. 
31). 
(R. 567, depo. Hardy LeRoy Child p. 
These additional facts are necessary for the action against 
Springville City: Springville City performs maintenance each 
year on the Hobble Creek waterway which lies within its 
corporate boundaries. The City has responsibility for main-
tenance of the bridge located at 700 East and 650 South (R. 
573, depo. of Carl Curtis, p. 10). The City has replaced 
diversion structures, pipes and bridge decks at Swensen Dam 
(R. 171, 172). It also clears debris from the stream and 
cleans the culverts (R. 570, depo. of Jack Windley, p. 11). 
In addition to maintaining structures on and in Hobble Creek, 
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Springville City also shores up the banks and dredges certain 
portions of the creek (R. 573, rlepo. of L'arl Curtis, p. 16). 
The city has assumed responsibility for the control of 
water hazards on Hobble Creek. It repairs irrigation culverts 
within the city limits. The Springville City ordinances refer 
to impounded water as an "attractive nuisance" (Springville 
City Ordinances §12-2-4, see Appendix"A").Although not 
directly related to water hazards, the City issues building 
permits only upon compliance with regulatory provisions 
promulgated for the public safety, including the covering of 
irrigations ditches (Springville City Ordinances §10-1-4, 
see Appendix "B"). 
An irrigation waterway, running approximately parallel 
to the Hobble Creek waterway, traverses the property of defen-
dant Virginia B. Law. The irrigation waterway was covered to 
eliminate the hazard which is presented to children. ( Depo. 
of Biesinger p. 18) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A HARSH REMEDY, AND DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED 
WHEN SIGNIFICANT ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
. the judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, lf 
any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment should not be 
granted because significant issues of material fact exist and 
defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The trial court, in granting the motions for summary judgment, 
ignored these essential principles of summary judgment analysis 
under Utah law. 
First, upon motion for summary judgment, the trial court 
is required to consider all relevant facts and the reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the party against whom 
the motion is made. The Utah Supreme Court commented on this 
issue in Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 
420, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (1966): 
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh 
measure, and for this reason plaintiff's 
contentions must be considered in a light 
most to his advantage and all doubts re-
solved in favor of permitting him to go to 
trial; and only if the whole matter is so 
viewed, he could, nevertheless, establish 
no right to recovery, should the motion be 
granted. 
For other numerous references made by the Court to this 
proposition see, W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co., 627 
P.2d 56 (Utah 1981); Hughes v. Housely, 599 P.2d 1250 (1979); 
Livingston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 565 
P.2d 1117, 1118 (Utah 1977); Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 
432 P.2d 60, 62 (1967). 
Second, if the facts and their reasonable inferences when 
viewed in a light most favorable for the non-moving party are 
in dispute, summary judgment is simply improper. In Holbrook 
Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court 
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stated: 
It is not the purpose of the summary judg-
ment procedure to judge the credibility of 
the averments of the parties, or witnesses, 
or the weight of the evidence. Neither is 
it to deny parties the right to a trial to 
resolve disputed issues of fact. Its pur-
pose is to eliminate the time, trouble and 
expense of trial when upon any view taken 
of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to pre-
vail. 
Id. at 193. See also, Peterson v. Fowler, 29 Utah 2d 386, 510 
P.2d 523, 526 (1978); University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 
29 Utah 2d 1, 504 P.2d 29, 31 (1972); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. 
v. United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970); 
and Robinson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 22 Utah 
2d 163, 540 P.2d 91, 92 (1969). 
Under the above-stated principles of Utah law, plaintiffs 
submit that the defendants' motions for summary judgment should 
have been denied. First, if the facts and the reasonable 
inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the plain-
tiffs, recovery is certainly possible. Second, there are dis-
positive issues of fact which are in substantial dispute, as 
are detailed in the following points of this brief. Third, 
this case is certainly not a "clear-cut" case for summary 
judgment, and the plaintiffs should be allowed the opportunity 
of "at least attempting to prove" their allegations. 
Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). 
POINT II 
THERE ARE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT AND THE DEFENDANT BIESINGER IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
-9-
Durham v. 
Plaintiffs' cause of action against defendant Biesinger 
is based on negligence and defendant's breach of contract. 
The duty owed to plaintiffs by the defendant arises as a result 
of defendant's actions in renting his apartment to plaintiffs 
and from his affirmative representations, through his agents, 
to the effect that small children were protected from the 
adjacent hazard of Hobble Creek and its appurtenant struc-
tures. As is demonstrated below, the facts in this case are 
in dispute, and must be read in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiffs. Summary judgment is, therefore, not an appro-
priate means of resolving this matter. 
A. There Are Material Issues Of Fact Relating to Defendant 
Biesinger's Contractual Assumption of A Duty To Jonathan Weber 
Based Upon The Representations Of His Agents, Plaintiffs' 
Reliance Upon Those Representations In Entering Into The 
Contract, And The Meaning of the Relevant Contract Provisions. 
Plaintiffs' depositions on file herewith clearly indicate 
that representations were made to them by defendant Biesinger's 
agents that there were numerous small children who played in 
the common area of the apartment building, that the fence 
which inhibited access to Hobble Creek had been erected and 
was maintained for the purpose of preventing small children 
from entering the stream, and that the common area was safe. 
These representations were made at a time when the Webers were 
attempting to decide whether or not to rent an apartment from 
the defendant, and these representations were made as an 
inducement for them to rent. Plaintiffs relied on these 
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representations and but for the representations they would not 
have entered into the rental contract. The plaintiffs entered 
into a lease contract with the defendant Biesinger. As part 
of his contractual obligation, defendant contracted to main-
tain both the interior and exterior of the premises in a safe 
and operable condition. (R. 529). Plaintiffs have alleged by 
affidavits that the fence at the rear of the common area of 
the defendant Beisinger's apartments was in disrepair, without 
a proper gate, and incapable of adequately protecting small 
children from the adjacent hazard of Hobble Creek. (R. 355, 
356, 425, 426). Therefore, defendant breached a material 
clause of the contract. Defendant argues that, on the basis 
of the testimony of Gene Wing that the fence was in good 
repair and did have a gate, he did not breach the contract (R. 
502). Plaintiff Don Weber indicated that these representations 
were made by persons purporting to be managers. Defendant 
adraits that there was another couple besides the Wing's who 
acted as managers during that time. (Depo. of Biesinger p. 
12). Defendant Biesinger argues that the conversations should 
be characterized with reference to a subsequent alleged con-
versation with Mrs. Wing. (R. 500, 501) If the Court views 
the plaintiffs' contentions as set forth in their depositions 
and affidavits in a light most favorable to them, it is clear 
that a material issue of fact exists as to the nature of the 
representations made, and the obligations which defendant 
contractually undertook. 
Regardless of what route Jonathan took, the fact that he 
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got to Hobble Creek after being placed in the apartment com-
mons, indicates by itself that defendant misrepresented the 
state of the apartment commons when he, through his agents, 
represented that the children were safe and that access to 
Hobble Creek was inhibited. 
As indicated by the above discussion, there is a dispute 
as to the material issues of fact concerning defendant's 
contractual obligations and his breach thereof. 
B. There Is A Material Issue Of Fact As To Whether The 
Defendant Biesinger's Conduct Constituted An Assumption Of A 
Duty To Jonathan Weber. 
Defendant Biesinger by his conduct and by his represen-
tations voluntarily assumed a duty. When the apartment complex 
was built defendant Biesinger constructed a fence with a gate 
to protect the small children in the complex from the danger 
of the running water in the irrigation ditch on the adjacent 
property. He recognized that Hobble Creek, just 40 feet 
farther from his property, was also dangerous. (R. 574 , depo. 
of Biesinger p. 8) Defendant Biesinger, however, allowed the 
fence to develop holes through which children would pass and 
did not maintain the gate. (R. 574, depo. of Biesinger p. 9, 
2 4' 31). 
In the present case, the duty of defendant Biesinger is 
established by the statements of his agents, the apartment 
managers, to the Webers when they were looking at the apart-
ments prior to moving in. When they inquired about the 
dangers of the creek to the rear of the property, the Webers 
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were told that children continually played in the back of the 
property, that there was a protective fence between the yard 
and Hobble Creek, and that there wasn't any worry of danger to 
the children. (Depo. of Don Weber pp. 10, 12) 
With respect to the plaintiffs' position that the defen-
dant Biesinger voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiffs, 
the Federal Court for the District of Utah has ruled that if 
the Utah Supreme Court were to consider the issue of good 
samaritan liability they would adopt that theory of liability 
as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§323 and 
324(A). Barnson, et al. v. United States, 531 F.Supp. 614 
(D.C. Utah 1982). Those Restatement sections indicate that if 
a party undertakes to perform an act, and third parties rely 
on that undertaking, then the third parties may maintain a 
cause of action against the good samaritan for negligently 
performing the said undertaking. In the present case, plain-
tiffs have alleged that the landlord undertook to construct a 
fence and other structures to inhibit access to Hobble Creek, 
and that they made representations to that effect to the 
plaintiffs in order to induce them to rent from the defendant. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on said representations has been alleged 
and is justifiable under the circumstances. 
There are material issues of fact raised by the deposi-
tions, affidavits and other matters on file relating to each 
of the elements set forth by the restatement. 
The facts of Herdt v. Koenig, 119 S.W. 56 (Mo. 1909) are 
closely akin to the factB in the instant case. A landlord 
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maintained a common yard behind a building which was used by 
children living in the apartment and their friends as a play 
area. Immediately adjacent to the landlord's property was a 
quarry, and the landlord had constructed a fence separating 
the common yard from the quarry. However, the fence was dan-
gerously constructed, and when one of the children leaned 
against a board of the fence, the top board loosened and 
detached from the post, and the child fell into the quarry. 
The defendant/landlord argued that since the quarry was on the 
land of another, he was not liable for the child's injury. 
The court disagreed saying: 
. it is urged that the quarry in this 
instance is not located upon the defen-
dant's premises, and therefore no liabi-
lity attaches to him on account thereof. 
It is sufficient to say on this score 
that, while the quarry was not upon the 
defendant's premises, it was immediately 
adjacent to and rendered the common yard 
dangerous. This fact was recognized by 
the defendant and all concerned. In view 
of the danger attending the situation, the 
defendant had erected the fence referred 
to, to the end of discharging his obli-
gation to exercise reasonable care for the 
safety of those rightfully upon the 
premises. Having erected a fence upon his 
premises as a barrier to the attendant 
dangers of the quarry, it, of course, 
evolved upon him to exercise ordinary care 
to maintain the fence reasonably safe for 
the purpose. Herdt v. Koenig, 119 S.W. 
at 59. 
When defendant Biesinger built the apartments, Hobble 
Creek and the open irrigation ditch were close by and posed a 
threat to the safety of the children in the complex. Defendant 
Riesinger recognized his duty at that time and constructed a 
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fence with a gate. (Depo. of Biesinger p. RI It would be 
difficult for defendant Biesinger to claim now that he could 
not foresee the risk of harm to the small children when he 
allowed the fence to deteriorate and did not replace the gate. 
In fact, he worried about the hole in the fence, recognizing 
that it had posed a threat to the safety of the small children. 
(Depo. of Biesinger p. 31) 
C. There Is A Material Issue Of Fact As To Where Jonathan 
Weber Fell Into Hobble Creek. 
Jonathan Weber was an infant 2 1/2 years old when the 
incident occurred. His mother had placed him on the east lawn 
of the apartment complex with some toys to play with. (R. 571, 
Depo. of Gene Wayne Wing p. 12, 62) Mr. Wing was in front of 
the complex watering the lawn, and Mrs. Wing was sitting on 
the porch of her apartment at the west end of the complex, and 
neither saw Jonathan go across the sidewalk in front of the 
complex. (R. 571, depo. of Gene Wayne Wing p. 62, 63, 64) 
Therefore, it is highly probable that Jonathan went into the 
back of the complex. He could also have gone up the hill to 
the bridge on the east side of the complex, past the bridge to 
the church parking lot, and then gone down to Hobble Creek 
and fallen in, but considering the child's age, his lack of 
familiarity with the surroundings, and the short time between 
when he was missed and when he was rescued, it is more proba-
ble that he went into the backyard, and either through a hole 
or through the opening where the gate should have along 
the well-worn path to Hobble Creek. There is a genuine issue 
of fact as to where he went into the 
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Regardless of what route he took, the fact that he got to 
Hobble Creek after being placed in the apartment commons, 
indicates by itself the nature of the mispresentation to plain-
tiffs, that the children were safe and that access to Hobble 
Creek was inhibited. 
D. Public Policy Should Require That When A Businessman 
Enters Into An Activity For Profit, And There Is A Known 
Danger Close By, And There Is No One Else Who Will Make The 
Venture Safe, And There Is An Economical And Feasible Way To 
Make It Safe, He Has A Duty To Make It Safe. 
Defendant Biesinger built the apartment complex in 1975 
with the intention of renting to families with children. 
Because of his profit motive he brought small children in 
close proximity to a serious danger. 
intervening property between that owned by defendant 
Biesinger and Hobble Creek is a narrow strip of property owned 
by the Laws and the L.D.S. Church which is vacant and which is 
unusable for the construction of any residential improvements 
due to the narrowness of its width and the lack of access to 
it. 
Since there is no one else who would have any motive to 
make Hobble Creek safe for the nearby children, the duty 
should fall upon defendant Biesinger who brought the children 
near to the danger in the first place because of his profit 
motive. 
Realizing that he had a duty to protect the children from 
the adJacent danger, defendant Biesinger erected a fence and 
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gate. Having undertaken the duty, and having represented that 
he had made the premises safe, he should have the liability 
for his negligence in the maintenance of the fence. To allnw 
summary judgment in favor of defendant Biesinger would open an 
avenue for nonliability for all landlords whose land is in 
close proximity to a dangerous condition. By deeding a small 
strip of land bordering the danger to another entity or indi-
vidual, or by refusing to purchase a narrow strip on the border, 
a landlord would be able to insulate himself from all liability 
merely by claiming that the dangerous condition is not on his 
land. The law should not allow a landlord to escape the duty 
he owes to his tenants by removing his ownership interest a 
short distance from the hazard, and then totally disregarding 
any obligation that he otherwise would have incurred. 
Public policy should require that when a businessman enters 
into an activity for profit, and there is a known danger close 
by, and there is an economical and feasible way to make it safe, 
that he has a duty to make it safe. Breach of that duty results 
in liability. 
POINT III 
THERE ARE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
RELATING TO THE ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF 
SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY AND DEFENDANT 
SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. There Is A Genuine Issue As To Whether The Defendant 
Maintained A Condition Which Posed An Unreasonable Risk To 
Children, And Was Negligent In The Protection Of The Diversion 
Access. 
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Springville irrigation Company exercised dominion and 
control over Swensen Dam and the diversion structures located 
adjacent to the apartment complex. 
The irrigation company did not own the land where the 
diversion was made, but it had the right of diversion, and the 
rights of ingress and egress to the point of diversion. It 
also had the right to construct a dam in the streambed. 
Although it denied the right to control water released down-
stream from the dam, Hobble Creek was used as an overflow 
system to release unwanted or unused irrigation water. These 
rights do not rise to the level of fee ownership, but they are 
possessory interests in the land. 
The dam across the stream was an artificial condition 
which was attractive to children. When asked whether children 
were seen going over Swenson Dam in the summer, the water-
master, Hardy LeRoy Child, indicated in his deposition that 
the children were there • . every day of ••. the summer. 
I'm scared some days to go up there." (Depo. ofHardy Child p. 
31) A child of Jonathan's age would be attracted to the 
tumbling waters of the diversion dam without a realization of 
the danger to him. The irrigation company knew that children 
were attracted to the dam because the children were seen there 
throughout the summer and the irrigation company also knew 
that the diversion work posed an unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm, evidenced by the watermaster's fear of the children 
playing there. Utah has been reluctant to apply the "attrac-
tive nuisance" doctrine to canals because of the massive 
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n e two r k l ") f n p e n i r c r. r· s r I, , ; 1 t . 1 r r t ,-'J. r rn l .::1nl1. l t 
h1,w+'''er, wh1:.'t'=' the irt l' n 
company ma i n ta l n s t he rl iv Pr s i ,-, n "'" r k -.d 1 1 h i s a 'J at her l n g 
place for young chilrlren in a residential neighborhood, anrl 
fails to exercise care in rlenying access to the diversion when 
the single location could easily he fenced and controlled, 
they have failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the 
danger and protect the children. Utah case law supports 
liability where structures which create an unreasonable risk 
of injury are placed in a streambed. 
93 P. 570 (Utah 1908). 
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 
B. Even Where The Courts Have Been Reluctant To Apply 
The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, Relief Has Been Granted On 
Theories Of Common Law Negligence. 
In Partin v. Olney, 591 P. 2d 74 (Ariz. App. 1978), two 
small boys were playing in an irrigation ditch, and had been 
seen by an irrigation company official who failed to warn them 
of the unforeseen hazards. The next day one of the boys 
drowned in the canal. The court said that where an agent of 
the company knows of the presence of children and the danger 
to them, and fails to take any action to remove the children, 
he has acted in reckless disregard of the safety of the 
ren. If the agent acts recklessly in the course of his emplc1 
ment, the attractive nuisance immunity for irr1gat1cn canals 
would not the :rr1g3t10n 
The Spr1ngv1lle :rr:.gat1\'·n ·,.;3ter"l2Stt-'r- a tr 
rem,>ve the ·:hil<Jr,,11 tr«rn the diversion work when he knew that 
they f•layP<i at the dam site and the diversion water posed an 
unreasonable risk to them. The irrigation company also had a 
duty to restrict access to the diversion works. Through the 
negligent breach of its duty, the Springville Irrigation 
Company is liable under a negligence cause of action. 
C. There Is A Genuine Issue Of Fact As To Where The 
Plaintiff, Jonathan Weber, Fell Into Hobble Creek. 
Despite the fact that no one actually saw Jonathan fall 
into Hobble Creek there are several reasons why Jonathan may 
have fallen in at or near the irrigation diversion. 1) The 
700 East crossing and the Swenson Dam are the stream access 
points nearest the apartment the Webers were moving into. 
The time within which the accident occurred supports the con-
clusion that Jonathan could have fallen in at the diversion 
works. 2) Swenson Dam is the most easily entered stream 
access point on the south side of the creek. Jonathan could 
have easily proceeded to the diversion location, fallen in, 
and could have been swept to where he was retrieved in 30 
second feet of water, which was the approximate stream flow 
below the diversion when the accident occurred. (De po. of 
Hardy LeRoy Child, p. 6, 9) 3) For Jonathan to have fallen 
into the stream through access at the extreme west end of the 
building, he would have had to walk the entire length of the 
building. Then he would have had to turn north, walk past the 
garbage receptacles, across the backyard, past the dogs of 
""ruch he ·..ias fearful (Depo. of Don Weber p. 48, 53, 54), go 
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through an opening in the fence and t1nally cross a large sandy 
area before he reached the stream hank. (Depo. of Don Weber 
p. 49-56) This route is particularly long with many more oh-
stacles than the 700 East crossing near the diversion works. 
4) In looking for Jonathan, Donald picked a logical path that 
a young child would follow. He first glanced south across the 
parking lot to an open area, hoping the child would be there. 
He then proceeded east, around the eastern end of the building 
to where he could see the 700 East crossing and Swenson Dam 
area. (Depo. of Don Weber p. 59) After discovering that the 
boy was not on the banks to the east, Donald searched the back-
yard, and did not proceed to the western end of the building 
and north to the streambed until the previously mentioned areas 
had been searched. (Depa. of Donald Weber p. 20-23). The child 
was found approximately 10 minutes after he was missed at 300 
South and 400 East Street approximately 3000 feet from the 
apartment house. 
POINT IV 
SPRINGVILLE CITY OWED A DUTY OF CARE 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS ARISING OUT OF 1) CITY 
ORDINANCES AND 2) THE VOLUNTARY 
ASSUMPTION OF A DUTY. 
The duty of Springville City to the plaintiffs arises by 
1) City Ordinances, and 2) By voluntary assumption. The City 
has enacted an ordinance which states: 
"It shall be unlawful to cause, create, 
maintain or be the author of an attractive 
nuisance within the city. Any vacant lot 
or open area of ground into which the public, 
and particularly children, has access within 
which any of the following conditions occur 
is an attractive nuisance: (1) Ponding or 
impounding of water ..• (Springville City 
Ordinances §12-2-4, R. 431, Appendix "A". l 
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Plaintiff, in the above statement of facts, has pointed 
to several arlmitted practices on the part of the city, which 
at the very least, present a material issue of fact as to 
whether the city has caused, created, maintained or been the 
author of an attractive nuisance under its own definition. 
There is a material issue of fact as to whether the conditions 
of Hobble Creek, Swensen Dam and related structures constitute 
the ponding or impounding of water. 
Springville City assumed the responsibility of making safe 
the buildings constructed within its boundaries. It issued 
permits for that purpose. It also required that no building 
permit be issued for any property crossed or fronted by an 
irrigation ditch unless the ditch was covered or would be 
covered by the proposed construction. Springville City also 
assumed responsibility for the upkeep of Hobble Creek to pro-
tect its citizenry from the water hazard. 
When a governmental entity takes upon itself the responsi-
bility of caring for its citizenry affirmatively, it assumes 
the position of a "good samaritan" and is liable for its negli-
gence. This principle was espoused in Barnson, et al. v. 
United States, 531 F.supp. 614(D.C. Utah 1982). In that case, 
the plaintiffs alleged, among other causes of action, a cause 
of action for negligent inspection. The defendant moved for 
summary judgment but the motion was denied on the following 
basis: 
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Plaintiff's principle legal argument sup-
porting these claims is that defendant is 
liable on a "good samaritan" theory, based 
on Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sections 
323 and 324A (1965). Section 323 postu-
lates liability for one who undertakes to 
render services to another which he should 
recognize as necessary to protect the 
other, and fails to exercise reasonable 
care in performing that undertaking, so 
that either the risk of harm to the other 
is increased or the harm is suffered 
because the other relied on the under-
taking. Section 324A similarly defines 
liability when one undertakes to perform 
services for another with the same result, 
but necessary for the protection of a 
third person. In addition, Section 324A 
permits liability where the undertaking is 
a duty owed by the other to the third 
person. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has apparently 
never addressed or adopted the "good 
samaritan" doctrine, this court is of the 
opinion that it will adopt it when it is 
presented with the theory and appropriate 
facts. The court specifically notes that 
the Utah legislature has passed a statute 
exempting from liability medical practi-
tioners who render emergency aid in good 
faith. See Utah Code Ann. §58-12-23(1974). 
This statute appears to anticipate a "good 
samaritan" theory of liability, much as 
the Utah Products Liability Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-15-1 to 6(1977), anticipated the 
Utah court's later adoption of §402A of 
the restatement, which adoption was 
predicted four times under the Erie 
doctrine by this circuit (citations 
omitted). 531 F.Supp. 621. 
A case cited in Barnson, above, sheds additional light on 
the duty imposed on a governmental entity when it assumes a 
responsibility over inspections, licensing, and certification. 
United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188 (9th 
Cir. 1980) involved a suit against the federal government for 
failure to properly inspect an airplane under federal regula-
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tions. In allowing suit against the federal government the 
9th Circuit said: 
The FAA in inspecting and certifying the 
aircraft for air worthiness, was render-
ing a service for others, rather than per-
forming regulatory duties, and thus came 
within the "good samaritan" doctrine for-
mulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts; 
the basis of the claim against the govern-
ment being the negligence of the admini-
stration's inspection in which the air 
worthiness certificate was issued. The 
court further held that the FAA regulation 
of the airline industry in its inspection 
of aircraft were not discretionary func-
tions for the purpose of the Tort Claims 
Act. 
To the extent that the government is 
arguing that because "inspection and 
certification" of aircraft is a uniquely 
governmental function, liability may not 
be predicated upon misfeasance in such 
activity the government is plainly wrong 
(citations omitted). 614 F.2d 192. 
The defendant Springville City is a "good samaritan" under 
the Barnson case. It assumed a duty to the plaintiffs to pro-
tect them from Hobble Creek floodwaters. It breached its duty 
when it 1) failed to impose adequate requirements as a condition 
of issuing a building permit, ie. fencing, covering or other 
protection; and 2) Created and maintained a dangerous condition, 
eg. the retaining wall which guides a fast flowing floodstage 
stream. (More than 30 c.f.s., R. 567, depo. Hardy LeRoy Child, 
p. 6). 
POINT V 
SPRINGVILLE CITY AND SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION 
ARE JOINT TORTFEASORS IN MAINTAINING AN 
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS 
Springville City and Springville Irrigation Company, in 
contesting that Hobble Creek was not an attractive nuisance, 
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have relied on the common law developed hy the courts at the 
turn of the century. To begin with, this common law has been 
superceded by Springville City Ordinance §12-2-4 which defines 
the "ponding or impounding of water" as an attractive nuisance, 
and prohibits such ponding when children and the public have 
access to the area. The city and the irrigation company have 
violated the ordinance by building and maintaining Swensen 
Darn, and the structures surrounding it without necessary pro-
tection for the public. A darn, by definition, is an impounding 
device. The city cannot say that the irnpoundment is not an 
attractive nuisance, when it has affirmatively defined an 
attractive nuisance to include such physical impoundments of 
water. Even in the absence of the statutory definition, the 
common law development of the attractive nuisance doctrine with 
respect to irrigation streams has changed over the years. The 
cases of Chavoz v. Salt Lake City, 131 P. 901 (Utah 1913), and 
Sallady v. Old Dominion Copper Mining Co., 100 P. 441 (Ariz. 1909 
cited by the defendant in its Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment were early hardline developments 
in protecting irrigation companies from liability as an 
economic necessity; however, this hard line doctrine has been 
softened in subsequent cases. In a recent Utah case, 
Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City, 371 P.2d 211 (Utah 1962), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that an irrigation canal was not an 
attractive nuisance and that Salt Lake City was not liable for 
the drowning of a child because of failure to fence the canal; 
however, the ruling was decided by a narrow 3 to 2 vote, and a 
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strong dissent was written regarding the negligent mainenance 
of an artificial condition which poses an unreasonable risk to 
small children. 
The Arizona courts have radically changed their position 
since Sallady, supra. In Marble v. Parham, 416 P.2d 1006, 
1008, (Ariz. App. 1966), the Arizona Court said: 
We are impressed with the humanitary trend 
in favor of the child which lessens the 
impact of. • Sallady. 416 P.2d 1008. 
In a later case, Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 578 
P.2d 177 (Ariz. 1978), a suit was brought against the irriga-
tion company after a 12 year old boy allegedly fell into the 
irrigation canal while riding a bicycle over a bridge that 
crossed the canal. The trial judge granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, but the Arizona Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court saying: 
The defendant placed a bridge at a point 
where it could be anticipated that the 
public would use it to cross the canal ••. 
. it could be reasonably expected that 
children, as well as adults, would use 
this bridge. The defendant also had ample 
notice of the fact that the bridge was 
potentially dangerous. The bridge was in 
fact, open to the public generally and the 
defendants did nothing either to restrict 
the use of the bridge by the public or to 
make it safe for the persons they knew 
were using the bridge. 
The immunity given to irrigation districts 
in Sallady, supra, was based in sound 
public policy at the time .•• unfortunately, 
this immunity sometimes leads to the 
callous "public be damned" policy •••• " 578 
P.2d at 180. 
In the instant case Springville City maintains a bridge 
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over the stream with a footpath alongside. It also has 
helped to maintain the diversion structures in and about 
Swensen Dam. The present status of the law disfavors denying 
a plaintiff recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine 
where a child has been injured by an irrigation stream. 
Springville City and Springville Irrigation Company should not 
be excused from liability relying on an outdated doctrine, 
particularly where they have affirmatively defined the 
forbidden activity in which they have participated. 
POINT VI 
THE INABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO PINPOINT THE 
EXACT LOCATION WHERE JONATHAN WEBER ENTERED 
HOBBLE CREEK DOES NOT FORECLOSE ACTION 
AGAINST SPRINGVILLE CITY OR 
SPRINGVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY 
Springville City had control over the entire length of 
Hobble Creek. Springville City and Springville Irrigation 
Company exercised substantial control over the pertinent 
portion of the Hobble Creek streambed and the artificial 
structures thereon. The city repaired concrete retaining 
walls and bridges, shored up the banks and dredged the 
streambed when it felt it was necessary to channel the stream. 
A determination of the exact location where Jonathan 
Weber fell into Hobble Creek is admittedly not possible. No 
person was present when he entered the stream, and he is not 
mentally able to recount the incident, however, the observa-
tions of Don Weber, Winona Weber, Wayne Wing and Inga Wing, 
together with the timing of the event and the limitations of 
a two and one half year old child all provide sufficient 
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evidence to show the approximate location of Jonathan's entry 
into the stream. 
Springville City had assumed control over the entire 
stream and their liability is commensurate therewith. 
Although certain portions of Hobble Creek may not have been 
disturbed, the city had assumed an interest in the maintenance 
of the entire stream, and is responsible for consequences 
resulting from such actions. 
POINT VII 
DUE TO THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT LIABILITY 
ALL DEFENDANTS ARE STILL LIABLE FOR THEIR 
NEGLIGENCE DESPITE PLAINTIFF'S INABILITY TO 
PROVE THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE INJURY. 
In the landmark case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 
199 P.2d 1 (1948), three hunters, the plaintiff and two 
defendants, were hunting quail together. The plaintiff became 
separated from the defendants, and while waiting for them to 
come towards him, some quail flew up, and the defendants both 
shot at the quail. Pellets from one of the defendants' shots 
struck the plaintiff in the eye and in the lip. The plaintiff 
brought suit against the defendants for negligence, but could 
not prove which of the defendants shot the pellets which 
actually injured him. Despite the impossibility of this proof, 
the trial court found both defendants liable. This decision 
was appealed to the California Supreme Court which affirmed 
the trial court saying: 
Dean Whitmore has this to say: "When two 
or more persons by their acts are possibly 
the sole cause of the harm, and when two 
or more acts of the same person are 
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possibly the sole cause, and the plaintiff 
has introduced evidence that thP one of 
the two persons, or the one ot the same 
persons' two acts, is culpable, then the 
defendant has the burden of proving that 
the other person or his other act was the 
sole cause of harm (b). .The real reason 
for the rule that each joint tortfeasor is 
responsible for the whole damage is the 
practicle unfairness of denying the injured 
person redress simply because he cannot 
prove how much damage each did, when it is 
certain that between them they did all; 
let them be the ones to appoi:t ion among 
themselves. 
* * * * 
When we consider the i:elative position of 
the parties and the results that would 
flow if the plaintiff were requii:ed to pin 
the injury on one of the defendants only, 
a requii:ement that the burden of pi:oof on 
that subject be shifted to defendants 
becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers--
both negligent towards the plaintiff. They 
brought about a situation where the negli-
gence of one of them injured the plaintiff, 
hence it should rest with them each to 
absolve himself if he can. The injui:ed 
party has been placed by defendants in the 
unfair position of pointing to which defen-
dant caused the harm. If one can escape, 
the other may also and plaintiff is 
remediless. 199 P.2d at 3-4. 
The Summers court relied heavily upon an earlier Mississippi 
decision, Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666 (Miss. 1926). In Oliver, 
the facts of which parallelled Summers, the Mississippi court 
held: 
"We think that ... each (defendant) is liable 
for the resulting injury to the boy, al-
though no one can say definately who 
actually shot him. To hold otherwise 
would be to exonerate both from liability, 
although each was negligent and the inJury 
i:esulted from such negligence. 110 So. 
Page 668. 
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One of the latest discussions of this theory of joint 
liability is contained in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 
Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924 (1980). In that case, a woman 
had contracted cancer of the bladder because of the drug 
called DES which her mother had taken during pregnancy. The 
plaintiff's injuries did not surface until some 20 to 30 years 
after the drug had been ingested. The drug had also been pro-
duced by approximately 200 drug manufacturers. The defendants 
in this case demurred to the complaint, and the trial court 
sustained the demurrer on the grounds that the plaintiff could 
not identify which defendant had manufactured the drug respon-
sible for her injuries. The California Supreme Court reversed 
the decision of the trial court, and developed a hybrid of the 
Summers, doctrine in holding the defendants liable: 
"The most persuasive reason for finding 
plaintiff states a cause of action is that 
advanced in Summers; as between an innocent 
plaintiff and negligent defendants, the 
latter should bear the cost of the injury. 
Here, as in Summers, plaintiff is not at 
fault in failing to provide evidence of 
causation and although the absence of such 
evidence is not attributable to the defen-
dants either, their conduct in marketing a 
drug the effects of which are delayed for 
many years played a significant role in 
creating the unavailability of proof. 
From a broader policy standpoint, defen-
dants are better able to bear the cost of 
injury resulting from the manufacture of a 
defective product. 607 P.2d 936. 
The principles enunciated in the above cited cases are 
directly applicable to the present case. Each of the named 
defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff. Defendant Springville 
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City should have required that a safe fence be erected as a 
condition to receiving a building permit. Having permitted 
the building of Swensen Dam, the city should have required 
that adequate precautions be taken, ie. fencing, to protect 
against what the city ordinance defines as an attractive 
nuisance. Finally, having undertaken to improve, maintain, 
and alter the condition of Hobble Creek, by building 
retaining walls, replacing diversion structures, and dredging 
and clearing debris, the city voluntarily assumed the duty to 
make Hobble Creek safe. 
breached its duty. 
The defendant Springville City 
Springville Irrigation Company created an attractive 
nuisance. Children played at Swensen Dam all summer, and the 
agents of the defendant were fearful for the safety of the 
children, yet they did nothing about it. Springville Irriga-
tion Company had control of the flow of water down Hobble 
Creek to the extent that sometimes there was no water below 
Swensen dam, and when there was water in Hobble Creek it was 
the overflow of the irrigation system. Having materially 
altered the nature of Hobble Creek, and having created an 
attractive nuisance, the defendant Springville Irrigation 
Company owed a duty to plaintiffs which they breached. 
Defendant Biesinger made representations to plaintiffs 
upon which they relied in entering into a contract with 
defendant. Defendant contractually undertook to keep the 
apartment building safe by maintaining the fence which he 
represented inhibited access to Hobble Creek. He maintained 
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control over the common area of the apartments but allowed a 
condition to develop that posed a risk of harm to small 
children. Futher, having undertaken to fence against the 
dangerous running water behind his property, his negligent 
abandonment of the maintenance of the fence was a breach of 
his duty. Each of the defendants were negligent and as 
between the plaintiff and the negligent defendants, the latter 
should bear the cost of injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Biesinger clearly owed a duty to his tenants to 
maintain the common area in a safe condition for the use of 
his tenants. He acknowledged that duty by building a fence, 
and then repesented through his agents that the area was safe. 
He breached his duty by failing to maintain the fence and gate 
and the injuries to plaintiff Jonathan Weber were proximately 
caused by the negligence of defendant Biesinger. 
Defendant Biesinger also contractually assumed a duty to 
prevent access by small children to Hobble Creek by providing 
and maintaining an adequate fence. He breached his contractual 
obligation and the injuries to Jonathan Weber were foreseeable. 
The defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
because there are material issues in question, and his motion 
for summary judgment should have been denied. 
Defendant Springville Irrigation District created an 
attractive nuisance and altered the nature of Hobble Creek. 
It breached its duty to plaintiff and is not entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law because there are material issues in 
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question and defendant's motion for summary Judgment should 
have been denied. 
The defendant Springville City owed a duty to Jonathan 
Weber to guard against the attractive nuisance and hazardous 
condition present as a result of actions by Springville city 
and others whom it had power to control. While the duty of 
Springiville City may be partially a voluntarily assumed duty, 
it is still required to comport with the standard of due care. 
The question as to the precise point of entry into Hobble 
Creek by Jonathan Weber is not dispositive in the present case; 
therefore the defendants' motions for summary judgment should 
have been denied. Plaintiffs respectfully ask the court to 
reverse the orders of the Fourth Judicial District court of 
Utah County granting defendants' motions for summary judgment 
and to remend the case for trial. 
11. 
DATED this day of December, 1983. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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CHAPTER 2 
PLUMBING CODE 
10-2-1: Utah Plumhing Code Adopted. The Utah Plumbing Code 3' 
published by the Utah S1ate Board of Health, 1974 Edition, is hereby 
adopted as the C11y Plumbing Code. The 1ame is adopted, with the 
modification> 'el forth 1n 1hi> Title, as if fully set fonh herein. The Ci-
ty Recorder shall maintain a1 le31l three copies of 1aid plumbing code 
in h1' office for u'e and ir1'pectton bv the public as required by stale 
la" It 11iall be unla\\ ful 10 1n11all, alter or repair any plumbing in the 
City 1n vil1l:.it1()n of, 1H \\.Hhou1 l.'.llmrhing \\Ith, "uch plumbing 
t'111k ;:ltl: I .1, .1111-:1tJl·d h\ \lrd111.in .. c· ....,,1 . ..1rnenJl·J in 1.'l1d1l11.3Ctonl 
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CHAPTER 3 
ELECTRICAL CODE 
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